《管制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)雜志》通過(guò)為管制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)建立嚴(yán)格的基礎(chǔ)，為分析管制理論和制度提供了一個(gè)高質(zhì)量的論壇。它為研究人員、決策者和機(jī)構(gòu)提供了當(dāng)前理論和實(shí)踐的視角。該雜志出版理論和應(yīng)用著作，包括實(shí)驗(yàn)研究。研究?jī)?nèi)容涉及監(jiān)管的各個(gè)方面，包括自然壟斷、反壟斷與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策、激勵(lì)監(jiān)管、放松監(jiān)管、拍賣理論、新政策工具、健康與安全監(jiān)管、環(huán)境監(jiān)管、保險(xiǎn)與金融監(jiān)管、危險(xiǎn)與固體廢物監(jiān)管、普遍服務(wù)義務(wù)、消費(fèi)品監(jiān)管等傳統(tǒng)問(wèn)題。

The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing rigorous foundations for the economics of regulation. It provides researchers, policymakers, and institutions with current perspectives on both theory and practice.This journal publishes both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research. It addresses research on all aspects of regulation, including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation.